01557nam a22001937a 450000500170000000800410001702000180005804000070007608200160008310000180009924500790011726000410019630000270023736500440026452010070030865000160131565000230133165000090135420251010095428.0251004b        |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  a9781107569782  cAL  a333.2bOSTG  aElinor Ostrom  aGoverning the commonsb: The evolution of institutes for collective action  aUKbCambridge University Pressc2025  axvi,280p.bPBc22x14cm  2Economicsa3801b18.99c£d121.90e20%  aThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.  aReflections  aSelf Organizations  aCPRS